Introduction
Environmental assessment (EA) is "a procedure for assessing environmental implications of a decision to enact legislation, to implement policies or plans, or to initiate development projects ... and the conveying v of this information at a stage when it can materially affect their decision, to those responsible for sanctioning the proposal". (Walhcrn, 1988) . As a regulation it has become integrated into land dse planning to greater or lesser degrees in countries throughout the developed and developing world. As a technique for decision-making EA is often claimed to promote sustainable development if it is rigourously applied. Although this is a grandiose claim, the provision of timely information to decision-makers and the ex ante highlighting of possibly unforeseen impacts may be expected to enhance environmental management. Indeed, the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brunutland Report) (WCED, 1987) specifically advocated the use of this technique to promote the management of natural resources. , , ,
This paper wilj first give a brief review of how environmental assessment developed as a widely recognised technique for the appraisal of development initiatives internationally. Since the development of the ' , techniques in the US under die influence of Federal legislation, environmental assessment has now become widely known and discussed. In Zimbabwe, EA legislation is at a formative stage, with some experience of the techniques in bo ill private and public sector.development. The next section .highlights some current thinking in the economic, as well as the physical, appraisal of environmental impacts, and stresses the ■ '
• ■ r complementarity of tire techniques with reference to a case study of a proposed dam project in Zimbabwe.
There then follows a discussion of llte constraints on regulators and developers on the implementation of these and other environmental policies, drawing from the experience of other countries with existing legislation. *»• .
Internationalisation of Environm ental Assessment
The techniques of EA were developed during the 1960s in the US, and were associated mainly with
•pollution control. Subsequent guidelines on screening criteria tend to follow those of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, this legisladon initialed the requirements of EA for federal expenditure and was then taken up by local and state legislation to re-establish their primary role in land'use planning.
During EA's evolutionary period investments by federal authorities requiring sensitive land uses were subject to the legislative process and submitted environmental impact statements on the advice of the Council on Environmental Quality, also established by the Act. At the margin of federal legislation, die legal svslcm was required to determine whether an environmental assessment was required which was,felt to ' ' J ' • / increase public accountability of .the development proposals.
In the European Community (EC) the Environmental Assessment Directive (Council of the European
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Internationalisation of Environm ental Assessment
•pollution control. Subsequent guidelines on screening criteria tend to follow those of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, this legislation initiated the requirements of EA for federal expenditure and was then taken up by local and state legislation to re-esiablish their primary role in land-use planning.
During EA's evolutionary period investments by federal authorities requiring sensitive land uses were subject to the legislative process and submitted environmental impact statements oh the advice of the Council on Environmental Quality, also established by die Act. At the margin of federal legislation, the legal svslcm was required to determine whether an environmental assessment was required which was,felt to : ■ J • / increase public accountability of .the development proposals.
In the European Community (EC) the Environmental Assessment Directive (Council of the European Communities, 1985) enforced a similar set of guidelines to those in place in the US, but it was at the. discretion of the Member States to implement these. The rationale of a common standard, as well as minimising environmental damage, was to set the same environmental standards across the EC, in order to reduce non-price, competition advantages and the "export" of pollution between states. Eighty types of development projects were listed along with a set of die minimum information required. \ EC member states arc obliged to incorporate EC Directives into their national legislative systems, and this has been carried out by member states in various types of legislation. In die UK, EA has been incorporated into the land use planning system. The competent authority tends therefore to be local planning authorities, mineral planning authorities, or the dc facto planning authority, such as the Forestry Commission in the forestry sector. The regulations then cover private and public sector development, from large capital projects, such as motorway construction and die dumping of nuclear waste, to relatively small afforestation and intensive .agricultural developments where the environmental impacts are likely to be significant. There arc important exceptions to the regulations in the UK: public or private projects which are approved directly dirough parliament (such as the Channel Tunnel) and projects connected widi national defence arc often exempt. It is important to note therefore, the aspects of development to which EA does not extend in any set of regulations! though it is argued that in the UK, die environmental impacts of these projecL. tend to be fully documented in the planning procedures which they follow. .
It has been postulated that foreign aid, from multilateral and bilateral agencies has contributed to environmental degradation both through ill conceived project lending, or through perverse incentives in policy lending. Multi-lateral agencies through die 1980s, had begun to adapt environmental assessment principles to project lending. The World Bank procedures in project appraisal have become more comprehensive in identifying environmental impacts, with an environmental department in each regional directorate. This is seen as a complementary exercise to economic evaluation: the Bank's position1 still firmly lies within die monetary evaluation approach (or CBA approach) as:
"a.grcatcr effort needs to be made now to "internalise" as many environmerilabcosts and benefits as.possible by measuring them in money terms and integrating these values in the economic appraisal" (Munasinglie and Lutz, 1991, p6 
1) techniques arc unfamiliar to those carrying out and administering the assessments 2) independent appraisal and enforcement through post development monitoring is lacking 3) rent-seeking incentives exist for administrative arid consultative groups. ;
The influential World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) in its discussion of environmental issues and sustainability also perceive a need for environmental assessment at both the project and programme level:
"broader environmental assessments should be applied, not only to products and projects, but also to policies and programmes, especially, major macro-economic finance and sectoral policies that induce significant impacts on the environment" (V/CED.1987, p222).
Although the WCED provoked much debate for advocating prescriptions with conflicting aims,"almost making the manifesto infeasible (Redclift, 1988; Hueting, 1990) ,. some of the specific recommendations ' , •* . with regard to EA were taken up: "Interested governments should create an independent international assessment body to help developing countries, upon request, evaluate the environmental impact and sustainability of planned development projects" (WCED, 1987, p222 ).
This became the brief for the International Commission for Environmental Assessment (ICEA), which has conducted reviews of the international position, funded case studies, and assessed (he role for an organisation to coordinate EA internationally. The activities of the ICEA included a review of institutions and legislation in various countries, and specific impact assessments where methodological issues were addressed.
Methodological issues in appraisal of developments was not specifically addressed. There follows a review of the advantages and weaknesses of economic and environmental assessment techniques which arc highlighted with reference to ICE As Zimbabwean case study of the proposed Osbourne Dam.
Extended Cost Benefit Analysis and Environmental Assessment
The internationalisation and uptake of the techniques of environmental assessment pre supposes that they , will provide more relevant and timely information to decision-makers than will alternative decision criteria, and may be seen partly as a reaction to the negative environmental impacts of implemented projects (which have traditionally been analysed under a set of economic efficiency criteria in a cost benefit framework).
The range of possible techniques to provide timely information to decision-makers can be conceptualised as a spectrum from traditional cost-benefit analysis, where any non-monetised environmental effects are listed but not enveloped in the analysis; through revisionist (or extended) CBA where non-market or surrogate ■3 market techniques may be included, or'cridcal environmental assets arc treated differently; to the advocacy of environmental assessment techniques which are seen as the main decision aid, with an efficiency standard as one necessary criterion.
The extension of CBA to take natural resources more fully into account in planning decision-making has ' • / ■ focussed on the issues of the choice of an appropriate discount rate; the incorporation of sustainability criteria; and the monetary evaluation of non-markcled costs and benefits. The assumptions of positive time preferencc.and hypothetical compensation and redistribution which lead to the discounting procedure have been widely discussed in relation to natural resources (Price, 1991; Markandya and Pearce, 1991) , and as it is recognised that altering the rate may cause more environmental degradation, trade-offs are involved.
Further discussion is not entered into here. The feasible incorporation of a sustainability constraint into investment decisions at the portfolio level requires the identification and incorporation of shadow (or environmentally enhancing) projects into plan-making. Weak or strong sustainability constraints can then be placed on the decision, which .is discussed below.
) } ' Although it has been postulated that for sustainability to be operational, it must do so in die social, political, economic and ecological domains, neo-classical economics provides one of the few operational definitions. The following summarises the exposition of Barbier et al. (1990) . The usual decision criterion in cost benefit analysis is (hat the present value of the net benefits of a project (or scries or portfolio of projects) is greater than equal to zero for a single project:
where T is the time horizon Bi = benefits'in time period t ■ ■ \ Ct = costs in time t r = rate of discount > Over a portfolio of projects (i = 1 ... n), the rule can be relaxed to be that the net present value across die portfolio can be positive! If environmental or resource depletion is recognised as an important constraint to project failure and furdier environmental disbenefils (Eii is the environmental dishenefitof project i in time , l), dicn over a portfolio of projects the cost benefit rule becomes nT X c E it-C it-E iO /O + r)! > 0 -Given this rule, the environmental damage can still be positive over the whole portfolio (the stock of natural capital can be degraded) as the non-environmental benefits can outweigh the environmental disbenefils. Barbier ef a/.'(1991) Uien introduce the concept of shadow (or environmentally compensating) projects with positive environmental benefits of A. It is this shadow project concept which has been identified as. the operationalisation of sustainability within policies or programmes of investment. If there is one shadow project, then the decision rule is to maximise total net benefit from a set of normal and shadow projects:
. and sustainability constrains this in the following ways:
At>£Ej for each time period , (strong sustainability)
Weak sustainability then constrains investment so that net environmental damage over time is less than zero; and strong sustainability'constrains decisions so that net environmental damage is less than zero in'
; every time period (or the net present value of the sum of the environmental benefits from the shadow 'project has to be greater than the net present value of the sum of environmental disbenefils from the normal projects for weak sustainability; and the sum of the environmental benefits from the shadow project has to be greater than the sum of the environmental disbenefils from die normal projects in all time periods for strong sustainability). Few examples of shadow projects (environmentally enhancing projects to offset die environmental disbenefit of.another) exist, but a widely quoted; example is that of the Guatemalan Afforestation Project, where carbon emissions from a proposed thermal power station w'ere directly offset through a fund which re-afforested an area in Guatemala, thus sequestrating large amounts of carbon (see Trcxler et al., 1989) .
The problem still remains of accurately measuring the environmental (and other) benefits and disbenefils; in the acceptance of the concepts of weak and strong prefixes to the intuitively appealing "sustainability"; arid in the identification of the portfolio of investment, an area obviously open to much subjectivity. It is to bC' stressed that this revisionist neo-classical environmental economics approach has been criticised for ignoring non-linear dynamics in natural systems which allows cost benefit calculations to be made over a future time period (sec Meams, 1991).
The Total Economic Value concept, as discussed by Johansson (1990) , Barbier (1991) , and Pearce and Turner (1990) among others, is a concept which allows the marketed and non-marketed benefits of an Functional values refer to the services provided by the environment which may not bo directly consumed.
, These arc the potential of the environment to act as a sink for pollutants, the role it plays in maintaining a stock of diverse species, or in maintaining micro-climatic stability. Again the value of these services can be elicited through opportunity cost in surrogate markets, or the cost of replicating the resource if a particular aspect is lost through development.
Option and existence values refer to the values accruing to a resource which arc additional to direct or even functional values; value which may be held by those distant from the resource. Option value occurs due to the desire to not use or degrade a resource in the present time period because of a risk premium (the desire to.
have the resource available at some future time), and an irreversibility effect (as lime passes more* . information accumulates as to 'the value of the resource and a more rational decision can be inade) (Johansson, 1990; Fisher and Hanemann, 1990 ). An overlapping concept is that of existence value, which is the welfare gained from knowledge of existence of a resource due to bequest or ecoeentric motives, even without any direct or indirect use being envisaged. , _ ' -Both of these values can only be feasibly elicited through expressed preference techniques such as the contingent valuation method. Barbier (1991) notes that these values tend to be held only by urban populations who do not have a chance to experience the natural environment which they may value, and that these may be held by urban populations in all countries, developing and developed (who arc usually accredited with holding existence values of tropical rainforests or whales for example). Examples of this analysis do exist (see Whittington et at. (1990) .for'instancc). However, the feasibility of these studies 6 critically depend on the inherent set of property rights involved (the implicit assignment of ownership rights which may be contrary to those riormallyprescnt), and the acceptability of a hypothetical market for the good or sendee to the population (Cummings et a/., 1986) . This latter variable will clearly be distinct Constraints on using techniques advocated by neo-classical environmental economics in appraising projects involving rural small scale farmers in developing countries, additional,to those mentioned above are discussed by Greeley (1991) . These arc. the high dependence of this population on natural resources; ftiil incidence of the pricing of these resources on the subsistence farmer; and the. high positive time preference being at odds with development planning with a long lime perspective. These factors have led to low takeup rates in development projects supposedly designed with ecological "sustainability" objectives in mind (Greeley, 1991) . Although die techniques for estimating the physical values of the likely enviroiimentalimpacts may be the -same as in an environmental assessment, or even based on die s?»me data sources (eg hydrological models of sedimentation, soil loss models, estimates of physical impacts of industrial pollutants), the extended CBA approach reduces these to a numeraire (ic monetary values); adds a further stage of error to the procedure (economic estimation which may only give lower bound estimates of TEV); and discounts the future which makes assumptions as to time preferences and individual and collective behaviour.
TOTAL ECONOMIC VALUE . i-;--------------------------r i
• y EA however, if not presented in a meaningful way, and not predicting the impacts accurately (as tends to be the case (sec Buckley, 1991; Adgcr and Whitby, 1991) ), present information on the impacts Without showing die trade-offs between the impacts; without ranking diem in order of magnitude and significance. -\ The institutional setting of environmental assessment has also tended to result in alternative projects not being considered, where the concept of shadow projects within a portfolio, or the without project scenario allow this to be simulated to an extent in an extended cost benefit analysis.
Environmental assessment though, has been envisaged as more of a design project tool, with recommendations for modification of the project design; mitigation,of expected impacts and consultation with the parties involved and those suffering the social and,environmental disbenefits of development activities. Both techniques have been shown to be weak on appraising the social effects.of development projects. EA in particular lends to concentrate on natural resource issues and have ignored, for example, the food security position of participants in agricultural projects, based oil sustainability objectives of soil
conservation (Greeley, 1991) . These methodological aspects are now discussed in-relation to a case study environmental impact of a dam development,, the Osbourne Dam indie Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe.
Environmental impacts o f the proposed Osbourne Dam
The proposed dam is to be constructed across tire Odzi river to inundate an area of 2900 ha which includes parts Of Makoni East, Mutasa South communal areas and Tsonzo small scale commercial areas in the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe. The majority of die area is arable land of classes II and III (rainfall 750-1000mm and 650-850mm respectively, resulting,in intensive or semi-intensive agriculture). The damming of the Odzi River was first proposed in 1922 to provide water to irrigate commercial farms downstream of the site. The original plans were shelved due to local resistance to the proposal; the commercial farms were subsequently allowed to draw water directly from the river.
The dam proposal was resurrected in 1985 and the government of Zimbabwe has since decided to proceed with the construction, the objectives being to provide water for irrigation to existing schemes and. to bring 630 ha undcr,small scale irrigation. In addition, it is envisaged that the dam will provide water to a proposed pulp and paper mill downstream of the dam at Odzi. The project is perceived by central government as an important development of Water resources in the Manicaland'region for bod; commercial agriculture and industrial sectors.
The environmental assessment carried out by ICEA, IUCN and the Ministry of Environment and Tourism to appraise this development (ICEA, 1990b) did not.have the opportunity to affect project design or implementation as it took place after, the decision to proceed had been made by central government. As a result, the assessment had the objectives of ameliorating or minimising environmental damage, and recommending strategics to enhance environmental benefits.
The'main potential environmental impacts of the project are then the loss of the agricultural land, with its agricultural production; the displacement of the population and associated costs (which forced the postponement of the original proposals in,colonial times); the potential increase in intensity of agriculture and population in die newly irrigated land; and the direct and secondary pollution effects of,the diversion of water and die creation of opportunities for industrialisation. These were highlighted by the EA and me listed in Table 3 . Column 2 shows how these environmental impacts were quantified in the assessment, where they were quantified, and the diird column shows how diese impacts could potentially be incorporated into tin extended cost-benefit framework. This table highlights the complementarity of the techniques in aiding decision-making if the timing of the appraisal is appropriate. Initially, there is a need to quantify the physical impacts. Economic analysis of \ natural resources relies on the information provided by the experts; ecologists or engineers. After physical f impacts have been established there is clearly a need to determine the efficacy of litis particular investment in relation to its opportunity cost: would lltc resources be belter allocated elsewhere?. The discussion in the previous section highlights potential difficulties in placing a monetary value on every identified impact.
The authors lacked time and resources to carry out the economic analysis of this project, the result of which would not necessarily be different to that of the study on which the decision was based. The efficiency of this investment would however, be required to be a more efficient allocation of resources when compared to the alternative uses, on which a cost benefit analysis of the single project would not enlighten.
• . '
3 Institutions: EA as public policy analysis tool and regulation
Scope for government action on the environment
The case for environmental policy intervention, from llie economic perspective, is based on market failure and government failure arguments -that total social costs of environmental degradation or use arc not taken /■ • into account in economic decision-making due to the public good nature of sonic environmental goods; that inlrageneralional and inlcrgcneralional equity issues arc ignored. Instruments for environmental policy include persuasion and education, largcllcd economic instruments and direct command and. control' rcguladons. The choice of instrument is dependent on the objectives in terms of enforceability, feasibility, efficiency and equity. ' ■ . _ Command and control mechanisms arc die dominant form of environmental policy instrument in developed economics, but the application of cconomic instruments such as carbon taxes and tradeable emission permits for pollutants are becoming more widely known and discussed. The scope for these policies in economics with iarge amounts of state intervention is discussed in Winpenny (1990) . Command and ' . ' r control is the obvious starting point for environmental policy, though die costs in efficiency terms of these arc well known, high enforcement and administration costs; lack of incentives for technological innovation; and differences in marginal costs of compliance to those under the regulations. These also represent opportunities for administradve bodies to further their own objective functions and status (as discussed below).
• ' / -. . -' The success of environmental policy depends on the extent to which this is harmonious with other objectives of government policy. Conflict1 between environmental and other policy goals has been illustrated in relation to die objectives of food security and environmental conservation in Zimbabwe (Bell and Hotchkiss, 1989) . In colonial times under die Natural Resources Act, restrictions were placed on cultivation and water use in dambos (depressions at the head of streams which retain moisture). The direct regulatory approach allowed enforceability and measurement. Conflict, especially in the communal areas now exists between the objectives of agricultural production, especially horticultural products, and conservation legislation which has now been modiiied (Bell and Hotchkiss, 1989) . Government policy has been lo strictly enforce ihe legislation in a cautious way, even with Agritex urging cultivation of the same land. The environmental consequences of distorting agricultural policies or prices may then have to be offset by environmental regulation enforcement, though Bell and Hotchkiss conclude that tire ease against communal management of dambos leading lo degradation is not proven, f ' ' .
• ';
The problems of other types of environmental policy, such as the use of taxes and subsidies (which may be more economically efficient by equaling marginal abatement costs across all creators of externalities) have been explained in terms of ignorance, mistrust; administrative and practical difficulties (discussed below);
and institutional and cultural bias towards direct regulation (Hanley et al. 1990 ). Rees (1988) argues that one of the main barriers To new regulation (or types of policy) is bureaucratic inertia, in that marginal changes (such as the revision of the National Conservation Strategy) are more acceptable than shifts of influence between central government ministries. Environmentalists oppose market based environmental policy and economic evaluation because these explicitly involve selling rights lo pollute, or placing a monetary "value" on environmental resources, which is equated with policies leading to some environmental degradation being desirable. For these reasons there tends to be conflicting interests in the promotion and implementation of environmental assessment legislation, which fundamentally puts environmental assets "beyond price" and enters this into the decision-making process, but gives a greater role to those administering and consulted on the regulations. , \ / -r In the Zimbabwean case, further, market based environmental policies would be impracticable, where the ethos of multilateral donors is that liberation of markets negates distortions which cause environmental degradation. Perverse price and subsidy incentives do cause environmental degradation (Maliar, 1989) , but this does not rule out market intervention to enhance environmental assets which internalise these in economic decisions. These policies have a role to play (Winpenny, 1990) . -\ ,✓ \ ' J Environmental assessment regulations would' then be supplementary to the existing framework of -. regulations and has similar characteristics of these command and control instruments. Lessons to be learned in the implementation of EA legislation to supplement existing environmental regulations come from experience in the UK, where this has recently been enforced as part of the land use planning system. Generalisablc conclusions follow from die study of Adger and Whitby (1991) on the implementation of.EA. regulations in the forestry sector. The study concludes that, as a regulation, die implementation has had little effect on the total amount of development (afforestation) to dale. In the more important aspect Of .
anticipatory planning, the EA regulations also.tend to have little impact as those carrying out the assessments are inexperienced in the techniques of assessment. Furthermore, the objectives of both the developers and administrators diverge from those of the regulations themselves, and in the absence of independent arbitration, they therefore tend tt^be largely ineffective. Constraints on the effectiveness of the environmental legislation, additional to the institutional aspects mentioned, will be in the timeliness of the information being provided, and the co-ordination of this towards decision-making which explicitly recognises tradeoffs between economic and resource conseivation objectives.
